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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Justin D. Bowman entered a conditional guilty plea to attempted strangulation and
possession of a controlled substance, and the district court sentenced him to an aggregate term of
fifteen years, with eight years fixed. Mr. Bowman now appeals from the district court's judgment
of conviction and raises the two issues reserved through his entry of plea. First, he argues the
district court erred by denying his motion to dismiss due a violation of his statutory right to a
speedy trial. Second, he argues the district court erred by denying his motion to dismiss due to a
violation of his right to be free from double jeopardy. In light of these errors, Mr. Bowman
respectfully requests this Court reverse or vacate the district court's orders and remand this case
for dismissal of the charges.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
On December 31, 2018, the State filed a Criminal Complaint alleging Mr. Bowman
committed two counts of attempted strangulation, one count of possession of a controlled
substance, and one count of domestic assault. (R., pp.13-15.) After a preliminary hearing, the
magistrate judge found probable cause for the offenses and bound Mr. Bowman over to district
court. (R., pp.25-26, 27.) On January 14, 2019, the State filed an Information charging
Mr. Bowman with these four offenses. (R., pp.29-31.) Mr. Bowman pied not guilty, and the
district court scheduled a three-day jury trial to begin on May 22, 2019. (R., p.33.) Before trial,
the State amended the Information to change the charge of domestic assault to telephone
harassment and to add the persistent violator sentencing enhancement. (R., pp.76-78, 103-06.)
The district court held the first day of trial as scheduled on May 22. (R., pp.161-64.) At
the start of the second day of trial, May 23, the district court held a hearing to address a tragic
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event that occurred the night before-the husband of Mr. Bowman's trial counsel unexpectedly
died. (Tr. Vol. I, 1 p.4, Ls.6-21.) The prosecutor was present, but Mr. Bowman and his trial
counsel were not. (Tr. Vol. I, p.4, Ls.11-13.) Another attorney from the public defender's office
participated in the hearing, and this attorney had "no information or any other knowledge of
what's going on in this case." (Tr. Vol. I, p.5, Ls.4-7.) The prosecutor proposed "to jointly move
for a mistrial, and the substitute public defender had no objection. (Tr. Vol. I, p.5, Ls.12-19.)
Upon the parties' stipulation, the district court stated:
I will note that Mr. Bowman is not present. There is no time to bring him up. It's
a scheduling order, and it's an issue that's beyond anybody's control. So I will
find that pursuant to Idaho Crimina 1 Ru 1e 2 9 .1, . . . a mistrial is appropriate.
[Trial counsel's] husband has passed away, and there's clearly no way that
anybody could step in to proceed in this trial.
(Tr. Vol. I, p.5, L.20-p.6, L.2.) The district court set a status hearing for mid-June 2019.
(Tr. Vol. I, p.6, Ls.6-8.)
On May 30, 2019, the district court filed Mr. Bowman's pro se motion for a mistrial
based on various evidentiary and procedural errors from the first day of the trial. (R., pp.180-81.)
The motion does not indicate the date that Mr. Bowman signed and mailed this motion for filing
with the court. (R., pp.180-81.) On June 6, 2019, the district court filed another prose motion.
(R., p.182.) In this motion, Mr. Bowman moved to dismiss two of the charges for violations at
the preliminary hearing. (R., p.182.) This motion was dated June 4, 2019. (R., p.182 (top right
comer).) Attached to this motion was another pro se filing: a notice of appeal for one of the
district court's pretrial rulings. (R., p.183.)
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There are eight separate transcripts on appeal, but only four are cited here. The first, cited as
Volume I, contains the second day of the jury trial, held on May 23, 2019. The second, cited as
Volume II, contains a status conference hearing, held on June 10, 2019. The third, cited as
Volume III, contains another status conference hearing, held on June 28, 2019. The fourth, cited
as Volume IV, contains the joint entry of plea and sentencing hearing, held on August 23, 2019.
2

On June 10, 2019, the district court held a status conference to reschedule the trial.
(R., p.184; see generally Tr. Vol. II.) Mr. Bowman and his trial counsel were present. (Tr. Vol.
II, p.4, Ls.8-10.) The first three available dates on the court's calendar were in August and
September, but the prosecutor was unavailable until October. (Tr. Vol. II, p.4, L.25-17.) The
district court set the trial for October 8, 2019, and Mr. Bowman's counsel had no objection.
(Tr. Vol. II, p.5, L.18-p.6, L.4.)
On June 21, 2019, the district court filed Mr. Bowman's pro se motion to dismiss the
charges due to a violation of his statutory speedy trial rights. (R., p.185.) Mr. Bowman argued
that Idaho law required a trial within six months. (R., p.185.) He also asserted that he would have
elected to represent himself to continue with the trial, but he was not present for the district
court's declaration of the mistrial in order to assert his right to self-representation. (R., p.185.)
On June 28, 2019, the district court held a status conference. (R., p.186; see generally
Tr. Vol. III.) Mr. Bowman and his counsel were present. (Tr. Vol. III, p.4, Ls.10-11.) The
district court addressed two issues raised by Mr. Bowman and his counsel. (See generally
Tr. Vol. III.)
First, Mr. Bowman's counsel argued that he wished to assert his speedy trial rights.
(Tr. Vol. III, p.5, Ls.17-18.) His counsel noted that Mr. Bowman was arraigned in January 2019
and his trial was not scheduled until October 2019. (Tr. Vol. III, p.4, L.25-p.5, 1.2.) His counsel
explained that the statutory six-month speedy trial period would run in mid-July 2019. (Tr. Vol.
III, p.5, Ls.1-2.) The State objected. (Tr. Vol. III, p.5, L.22-p.6, L.25.)
The district court ruled from the bench on the speedy trial issue. (Tr. Vol. III, p.7, L.4p.13, L.14.) The district court identified a four-part balancing test: length of the delay, reason for
the delay, the defendant's assertion of his speedy trial right, and prejudice caused by the delay.
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(Tr. Vol. III, p.7, Ls.12-15.) The district court determined: (1) the reason for the delay (the
unexpected death) was a neutral factor and not attributable to either party; (2) the length of delay
(nine months from the Information to the trial date) was "of intermediate value"; (3)
Mr. Bowman's assertion of his speedy trial rights (June 21 in his pro se motion) was a delayed
assertion; and (4) the prejudice to Mr. Bowman (being in custody past six months) was a factor
to consider. (Tr. Vol. III, p.8, L.13-p.9, L.24.) The district court also determined, based on the
reason for the mistrial, that it was impossible to have the trial within six months of the filing of
the Information. (Tr. Vol. III, p.9, L.25-p.10, L.3, p.12, Ls.5-9.) Upon the district court's
inquiry, Mr. Bowman's counsel informed the district court that it would be difficult to prepare an
adequate defense by the six-month July deadline due to the number of witnesses and securing
their attendance. (Tr. Vol. III, p.12, Ls.10-17.) Mr. Bowman told the district court that he wanted
to go forward with the trial as soon as possible, even if his counsel would be unprepared.
(Tr. Vol. III, p.12, L.18-p.13, L.9.) The district court then ruled that, although Mr. Bowman
asserted his speedy trial rights, "it would be to the defendant's extreme detriment" to proceed
with a July trial date. (Tr. Vol. III, p.13, Ls.10-14.) The district court moved the trial up to
August 27, 2019. (Tr. Vol. III, p.13, Ls.15-16, p.14, Ls.24-25.) In light of Mr. Bowman's
multiple prose filings, the district court then asked Mr. Bowman if he wanted to proceed prose,
and Mr. Bowman said no. (Tr. Vol. III, p.15, Ls.3-13.)
Second, Mr. Bowman raised another prose issue. (Tr. Vol. III, p.15, Ls.14-17.) He read
to the district court another prose motion that he intended to file. (See Tr. Vol. III, p.15, L.18p.17, L.18.) In this motion, Mr. Bowman moved to dismiss the case with prejudice because
double jeopardy attached and "a mistrial was declared ex parte in violation of my constitutional
rights through due process, my notice to be present or to be heard, and my Sixth Amendment
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right to representation, be it attorney or self" (Tr. Vol. III, p.17, Ls.19-23.) He argued that the
failure to inform him about the situation on the morning of May 23 violated his constitutional
rights. (Tr. Vol. III, p.17, L.24-p.18, L.2, p.18, L.20-p.19, L.3.) He asserted, if adequately
informed, he would have elected to represent himself and continue with the trial. (Tr. Vol. III,
p.18, Ls.3-19, p.19, Ls.7-10; see also R., pp.187-88 (written prose motion to dismiss due to
double jeopardy violation).) Mr. Bowman's trial counsel stated, "as a practical matter,"
Mr. Bowman would have been "impaired" in his defense because it would have been
"impossible" for him to access discovery or exhibits. (Tr. Vol. III, p.19, L.23-p.20, L.9.)
The district court recognized, "in retrospect," it probably should have delayed the hearing
on the morning of May 23 to have Mr. Bowman "brought up" and be present for the declaration
of the mistrial. (Tr. Vol. III, p.21. Ls.1-3.) "Nevertheless," the district court explained that it
declared a mistrial on behalf of the parties' stipulation, and Mr. Bowman would have been
unable to represent himself starting in the middle of the trial. (Tr. Vol. III, p.21, Ls.10-15, p.21,
L.20-p.2, L.12.) The district court identified "numerous complicated and intricate arguments" on
the admission of certain evidence. (Tr. Vol. III, p.21, L.22-p.22, L.3.) The district court also
identified that Mr. Bowman would not have had access to exhibits or the ability to call in
witnesses. (Tr. Vol. III, p.22, Ls.4-12.) In light of those issues, the district court reasoned:
Had the Court not declared a mistrial, the defendant would have been left with
ineffective assistance of counsel, and this Court is of the abiding belief that the
defendant would have been convicted had the trial proceeded in [his counsel's]
absence, whether it was with other counsel or whether the defendant had
attempted to proceed prose.
(Tr. Vol. III, p.22, Ls.13-18.)
The district court also made factual findings with respect to Mr. Bowman's prose motion
to dismiss. (Tr. Vol. III, p.22, L.19-p.23, L.11.) The district court found that Mr. Bowman's
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"post hoc" assertion on "his willingness to proceed pro se" was not in good faith. (Tr. Vol. III,
p.22, Ls.19-21, p.23, L.21-p.24, L.1.) The district court recalled that Mr. Bowman had an
"outburst" on the first day of trial, May 22, where he said that he wanted "to postpone this flat
out," and found that he would have moved for a mistrial based on his perceived errors from the
first day. (Tr. Vol. III, p.22, L.21-p.23, L.11.) The district court also noted Mr. Bowman's two
prior pro se filings from May 30 and June 6. (Tr. Vol. III, p.24, Ls.5-12, p.24, Ls.14-19.) His
May 30 filing was a motion for a mistrial, and his June 6 filing contained no request to proceed
prose. (Tr. Vol. III, p.24, Ls.5-12, p.24, Ls.14-19; see also R., pp.180-81, 182-83.) Based on
all of these facts, the district court found Mr. Bowman's current assertion that he would have
elected to proceed pro se instead of declaring a mistrial was "not made in good faith." (Tr. Vol.
III, p.24, Ls.19-21.) The district court concluded that any error in not bringing Mr. Bowman into
the courtroom for the declaration of the mistrial was "harmless" because the district court would
not have permitted Mr. Bowman to go prose. (Tr. Vol. III, p.24, L.22-p.25, L.4.)
On August 23, 2019, Mr. Bowman entered an Alford2 plea to one count of attempted
strangulation and pied guilty to possession of a controlled substance, pursuant to a plea
agreement with the State. (Tr. Vol. IV, p.5, Ls.8-14, p.14, L.9-p.16, L.22; .R., pp.225, 237.) The
State agreed to dismiss the remaining charges. (Tr. Vol. IV, p.8, Ls.13-15.) The parties agreed to
recommend fifteen years, with eight years fixed, for attempted strangulation and seven years,
with three years fixed, for possession of a controlled substance, to be served concurrently.
(Tr. Vol. IV, p.8, L.20-p.9, L.1.) The parties also agreed to a period of retained jurisdiction.
(Tr. Vol. IV, p.9, Ls.1-2.) Mr. Bowman reserved the right to appeal the district court's denial of
his two pro se motions on the speedy trial and double jeopardy violations. (Tr. Vol. IV, p.10,

2

North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
6

L.10-p.11, L.1; R., p.237.) Mr. Bowman agreed to go directly to sentencing. (Tr. Vol. IV, p.16,
L.25-p.17, L.8.) The district court followed the plea agreement and imposed an aggregate
sentence of fifteen years, with eight years fixed. (Tr. Vol. IV, p.19, Ls.6-18, p.21, Ls.2-8.) The
district court also retained jurisdiction. (Tr. Vol. IV, p.19, Ls.19-20.)
Mr. Bowman timely appealed. (R., pp.251-54.)
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ISSUES
I.

Did the district court err by denying Mr. Bowman's motion to dismiss the charges due to
a violation of his statutory right to a speedy trial?

II.

Did the district court err by denying Mr. Bowman's motion to dismiss the charges due to
a violation of his right to be free from double jeopardy?

8

ARGUMENT
I.

The District Court Erred By Denying Mr. Bowman's Motion To Dismiss The Charges Due To A
Violation Of His Statutory Right To A Speedy Trial

A.

Introduction
Mr. Bowman argues the district court erred by denying his pro se motion to dismiss the

charges due a violation of his statutory right to a speedy trial within six months of the
Information's filing. Mindful that the trial was postponed upon his counsel's stipulated motion
for a mistrial, he nonetheless argues the State failed to establish good cause for the delay.
Therefore, he respectfully requests this Court reverse the district court's decision denying his
motion and vacate this case with instructions to dismiss the charges against him.

B.

Standard Of Review
"Whether there was an infringement of [the defendant's] statutory right to a speedy trial

presents a mixed question of law and fact." State v. Clark, 135 Idaho 255, 257 (2000). "The
ultimate question of whether legal excuse has been shown is a matter for judicial determination
upon the facts and circumstances of each case." State v. Risdon, 154 Idaho 244, 247 (Ct. App.
2012). The Court defers to the district court's factual findings if supported by substantial and
competent evidence, but the Court exercises free review over the district court's legal
conclusions. Clark, 135 Idaho at 257.
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C.

The District Court Erred By Denying Mr. Bowman's Motion To Dismiss Because The
State Had Not Shown "Good Cause" To Allow The Violation Of His Statutory Right To
A Speedy Trial
Idaho Code § 19-3501 "sets specific time limits within which a criminal defendant must

be brought to trial." Clark, 135 Idaho at 257. It states in relevant part:
The court, unless good cause to the contrary is shown, must order the
prosecution or indictment to be dismissed, in the following cases:

(2) If a defendant, whose trial has not been postponed upon his application, is not
brought to trial within six (6) months from the date that the information is filed
with the court.
LC. § 19-3501(2). "Thus, under LC. § 19-3501, criminal defendants are given additional
protection beyond what is required by the United States and Idaho Constitutions. The statute
mandates that unless the State can demonstrate 'good cause' for a delay greater than six months,
the court must dismiss the case." Clark, 135 Idaho at 258 (citation omitted).
Before the Court can examine "good cause" for the delay, the Court must consider
whether the defendant's "application" "postponed" the delay. LC. § 19-3501(2). "Once the trial
has been postponed, the six-month statutory period no longer applies." State v. Lundquist, 134
Idaho 831, 833 (2000). For example, in State v. Folk, the Court held the defendant waived the
six-month protection under LC. § 19-3501(2) even though the defendant's request for a
continuance kept the trial date within the six-month period. 151 Idaho 327, 332 (2011). The
Court reasoned, once the defendant makes any "application" to postpone the trial, he loses any
future protection from the statute. Id. If the trial is postponed upon the defendant's application,
the Court "need not address whether there was good cause under the statute." Id. Mindful that
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Mr. Bowman's substitute counsel postponed the trial by stipulating to the mistrial, Mr. Bowman
nonetheless argues the State has not shown good cause for the delay. 3 (Tr. Vol. I, p.5, Ls.12-19.)
Here, Mr. Bowman submits the State has not met its burden to establish good cause for
the delay. "[T]he State bears the burden to demonstrate good cause for a failure to bring a
defendant to trial within the six-month limit." State v. Jacobson, 153 Idaho 377, 378 (Ct. App.
2012). "[G]ood cause means that there is a substantial reason that rises to the level of a legal
excuse for the delay." Clark, 135 Idaho at 260. The analysis of good cause focuses on the reason
for the delay-one of four factors relevant to a constitutional speedy trial violation. State v.
Risdon, 154 Idaho 244, 247 (Ct. App. 2012) (reviewing constitutional factors). The other three

factors-the length of the delay, whether the defendant asserted his speedy trial right, and the
prejudice to the defendant-are not considered if "the reason for the delay is well defined" and
"on its face clearly does," or does not, "constitute good cause." Id. Thus, the other three factors
are only considered if "there are multiple reasons for the delay attributable to both the State and
the defendant or the sufficiency of the reason alleged to constitute good cause is genuinely
subject to disagreement." Id. (citing Jacobson, 153 Idaho at 380); see also State v. Hernandez,
136 Idaho 8, 10 (Ct. App. 2001) (the district court may consider the other three factors "as they
bear on the sufficiency or strength of the reason for the delay"). "If the delay has been a short
one or if the defendant has not been prejudiced, a weaker reason for the delay in bringing the

3

In candor to the Court, Mr. Bowman also notes the following authorities: State v. Tinoco, No.
39659, 2013 WL 5970529, at *2 (Idaho Ct. App. Nov. 7, 2013) (unpublished) (noting, without
deciding, the State's argument that LC. § 19-3501 is satisfied with a mistrial because the
defendant is "brought to trial," and identifying other situations that could cause a trial to be
delayed, such as ''unexpected illness of jury members, attorneys, or the judge"); see also State v.
Avelar, 129 Idaho 700, 702 (1997) (holding the six-month limitation in LC. § 19-3501 does not
apply to a retrial after a successful appeal).
11

defendant to trial will constitute good cause for purposes of LC. § 19-3501." Hernandez, 136
Idaho at 11 (citing Clark, 135 Idaho at 260).
As found by the district court, the reason for the delay was "neutral," and therefore the
district court considered the other three factors in its analysis. (See Tr. Vol. III, p.8, Ls.15-17.)
Mr. Bowman maintains, on balance, the four factors weigh in favor of a statutory speedy trial
violation. First, the reason for the delay, sadly, was the unexpected death of Mr. Bowman's trial
counsel's husband and the consequent mistrial. Substantial reasons for delay that rise to the level
of legal excuse include a good faith interlocutory appeal, State v. Young, 136 Idaho 113, 116
(2001), multiple pre-trial motions by the defendant, State v. Livas, 147 Idaho 547, 551 (Ct. App.
2009), and true witness unavailability, Risdon, 154 Idaho at 249. Mr. Bowman submits the
mistrial here does not rise to the level of a legal excuse because, as asserted in his motion,
Mr. Bowman would have elected to proceed pro se and continue with the trial if he was present
for the declaration of the mistrial. (R., p.185.) However, Mr. Bowman again recognizes that his
substitute counsel agreed to the mistrial. (Tr. Vol. I, p.5, Ls.12-19.) Second, the length of delay
was forty-four days beyond the six-month limitation. 4 Third, Mr. Bowman had a delayed
assertion of his speedy trial rights. (Tr. Vol. III, p.9, Ls.9-10.) He did not assert his speedy trial
rights at the first status conference on June 10, 2019, when the district court initially reset the
trial to October 8, 2019. (Tr. Vol. II, p.5, L.18-p.6, L.4.) His speedy trial motion was filed on
June 21, 2019. (R., p.185.) Fourth, Mr. Bowman experienced some prejudice. The Court assesses

4

The State filed the Information on January 14, 2019, so the six-month limitation would lapse on
July 14, 2019. (The district court stated that the Information was filed on January 13, but the
file-stamp date is January 14. (Compare Tr. Vol. III, p.8, L.25-p.9, L.1, with R., p.29.)) After the
mistrial, the district court set the trial for October 8, 2019, but then reset the trial for August 27,
2019, after hearing Mr. Bowman's motion on the speedy trial violation. Thus, the trial was
ultimately scheduled for forty-four days past the six-month limit (number of days between
July 14, 2019, and August 27, 2019).
12

prejudice by reviewing "the interests that the right to a speedy trial is designed to protect. Those
interests are: ( 1) to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration; (2) to minimize anxiety and concern
of the accused; and (3) to limit the possibility that the defense will be impaired." State v.

Ciccone, 154 Idaho 330, 339 (Ct. App. 2012)). Here, although Mr. Bowman did not claim at the
hearing that his defense would be impaired by the delay, the district court found that
Mr. Bowman would likely remain in custody until the trial. (Tr. Vol. III, p.9, Ls.17-24.) In light
of these factors, Mr. Bowman argues the State failed to show good cause for the delay, and
therefore his statutory right to a speedy trial was violated after the declaration of the mistrial. As
such, while mindful of the mistrial stipulation, Mr. Bowman submits the district court erred by
denying his motion to dismiss due to the violation of his statutory right to a speedy trial.

II.
The District Court Err By Denying Mr. Bowman's Motion To Dismiss The Charges Due To A
Violation Of His Right To Be Free From Double Jeopardy
A.

Introduction
Mr. Bowman argues the district court erred by denying his pro se motion to dismiss his

case with prejudice due a violation of his right to be free from double jeopardy. He argues the
double jeopardy clause prohibited retrial in his case because manifest necessity did not justify the
district court's declaration of a mistrial. To this end, he asserts there was no manifest necessity
for the mistrial because he would have elected to proceed pro se if he were present at the
declaration of the mistrial. Therefore, he respectfully requests this Court reverse the district
court's decision denying his motion and vacate this case with instructions to dismiss his case
with prejudice.
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B.

Standard Of Review
The Court reviews the district court's decision to declare a mistrial for an abuse of

discretion. State v. Manley, 142 Idaho 338, 342 (2005).
When this Court reviews an alleged abuse of discretion by a trial court the
sequence of inquiry requires consideration of four essentials. Whether the trial
court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the
outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal standards
applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its decision by
the exercise of reason.
Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863 (2018). The Court exercises free review over

questions of law. See State v. Santana, 135 Idaho 58, 63 (Ct. App. 2000) ("[W]hether an
appellant's prosecution complies with the constitutional protection against being placed in
jeopardy twice is a question oflaw subject to free review.").

C.

The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Bowman's Motion To Dismiss Because
The Double Jeopardy Clause Prohibits Retrial After A Mistrial That Is Not Justified By
Manifest Necessity
"The double jeopardy clauses in the Idaho and federal constitutions prohibit putting one

in jeopardy twice for the same crime. This protection applies not only to multiple punishments,
but also to multiple prosecutions for the same crimes." State v. Manley, 142 Idaho 338, 343
(2005) (citing U.S. CONST. amend. V; IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 13; United States v. Dixon, 509
U.S. 688, 696 (1993); Avelar, 132 Idaho at 778. "The multiple prosecution component of double
jeopardy 'ensures that the State does not make repeated attempts to convict an individual,
thereby exposing him to continued embarrassment, anxiety, and expense, while increasing the
risk of an erroneous conviction or an impermissibly enhanced sentence."' Avelar, 132 Idaho at
778 (quoting Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493, 498-99 (1984)).
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"[A]s a general rule, the prosecutor is entitled to one, and only one, opportunity to require
an accused to stand trial." Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 505 (1978). This general rule
"does not mean that a criminal defendant is entitled to go free every time a trial fails to end in a
final judgment." Manley, 142 Idaho at 344. "Unlike the situation in which the trial has ended in
an acquittal or conviction, retrial is not automatically barred when a criminal proceeding is
terminated without finally resolving the merits of the charges against the accused." Washington,
434 U.S. at 505. "A criminal defendant may be retried if the first trial was prematurely
terminated by the district court, without the defendant's consent, due to 'manifest necessity."'
Manley, 142 Idaho at 344 (quoting United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579, 580 (1824)).

Retrial is permitted after a "manifest necessity" mistrial because the defendant's "valued right to
have the trial concluded by a particular tribunal is sometimes subordinate to the public interest in
affording the prosecutor one full and fair opportunity to present his evidence to an impartial
jury." Washington, 434 U.S. at 505.
The burden to demonstrate "manifest necessity" rests on the State. See State v. Sharp,
104 Idaho 691, 693 (1983). As the United States Supreme Court explained in Washington:
[I]n view of the importance of the right, and the fact that it is frustrated by any
mistrial, the prosecutor must shoulder the burden of justifying the mistrial if he is
to avoid the double jeopardy bar. His burden is a heavy one. The prosecutor must
demonstrate "manifest necessity" for any mistrial declared over the objection of
the defendant. . . . The words "manifest necessity" appropriately characterize the
magnitude of the prosecutor's burden.
434 U.S. at 505. The Court has described the manifest necessity standard as follows:
The basic rule is that criminal actions may be terminated by a mistrial without
double jeopardy consequences if there is a sufficiently compelling reason to do
so, some procedural error or other problem obstructing a full and fair adjudication
of the case which is serious enough to outweigh the interest of the defendant in
obtaining a final resolution of the charges against him-what is commonly termed
a "manifest necessity" or "legal necessity." The courts have generally declined to
lay out any bright-line rule as to what constitutes "manifest necessity," but have
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based their decisions on the facts of each case, looking to such factors as [ 1]
whether the problem could be adequately resolved by any less drastic alternative
action; [2] whether it would necessarily have led to a reversal on appeal if the trial
had continued and the defendant had been convicted; [3] whether it reflected bad
faith or oppressive conduct on the part of the prosecution; [4] whether or not it
had been declared in the interest of the defendant; and [5] whether and to what
extent the defendant would be prejudiced by a second trial. Since the trial judge is
ordinarily in the best position to observe the circumstances which allegedly call
for a mistrial, his or her judgment as to the necessity for a mistrial is commonly
deferred to; but that judgment may be set aside if the reviewing court finds that
the judge has abused this discretionary power, particularly where it appears that
the judge has not "scrupulously" exercised his or her discretion by making a full
inquiry into all the pertinent circumstances and deliberately considering the
options available ....
Manley, 142 Idaho at 344 (quoting State v. Stevens, 126 Idaho 822, 826 (1995) (omission in

original)). Although the district court has a wide range of discretion, a mistrial declaration
"cannot be condoned" "if a trial judge acts 'irrationally or irresponsibly.'" Id. at 345 (quoting
Washington, 434 U.S. at 514).

Here, the State and Mr. Bowman's substitute counsel joined in a motion for a mistrial
after the unexpected death of the husband of Mr. Bowman's trial counsel. (Tr. Vol. I, p.5, Ls.1219.) However, Mr. Bowman personally objected to the mistrial and contended that he would
have elected to proceed prose if he was present for the district court's declaration of the mistrial.
(R., pp.187-88; see Tr. Vol. III, p.17, L.19-p.19, L.14.) In these unique circumstances,
Mr. Bowman argues he had a right to be present in order to exercise his right to proceed pro se,
and the failure to have him present to exercise that right negates any manifest necessity for the
mistrial. Therefore, the district court did not act consistently with the legal standards when it
declared a mistrial.
"The U.S. Supreme Court has held that the right to be present at all proceedings is related
to ensuring a fair hearing." State v. Dunlap, 155 Idaho 345, 368 (2013) (citing Kentucky v.
Stincer, 482 U.S. 730 (1987) "Broadly speaking, a defendant's right to be present in the
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courtroom at each stage of his trial has been denominated a 'basic right' guaranteed by the Sixth
Amendment and the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." State v. Carver, 94
Idaho 677, 679 (1972) (citing cases). The right to be present, however, is not absolute. Dunlap,
155 Idaho at 368. Instead, "it guarantees a defendant 'the right to be present at any stage of the
criminal proceeding that is critical to its outcome if his presence would contribute to the fairness
of the procedure."' Dunlap, 155 Idaho at 368 (quoting Stincer, 482 U.S. at 745). The test to
determine whether a defendant's personal presence is required considers if "his presence has a
relation, reasonably substantial, to the fullness of his opportunity to defend against the charge."
Carver, 94 Idaho at 680 (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105-06 (1934)).
This Court has not yet ruled on whether a defendant has a constitutional right to be
present when the district court declares a mistrial. Although some jurisdictions have held that a
defendant does not have a right to be present,5 let alone the right to consent to a mistrial, 6

5

See People v. Ferguson, 494 N.E.2d 972, 976-77 (N.Y. 1986) (citing cases).
United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 609 n.11 (1976) ("This Court has implicitly rejected the
contention that the permissibility of a retrial following a mistrial or a reversal of a conviction on
appeal depends on a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver of a constitutional right."); see
also Gori v. United States, 367 U.S. 364, 368 (1961) (Where, for reasons deemed compelling by
the trial judge, who is best situated intelligently to make such a decision, the ends of substantial
justice cannot be attained without discontinuing the trial, a mistrial may be declared without the
defendant's consent and even over his objection, and he may be retried consistently with the
Fifth Amendment."); see Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 462 (1973) (quoting Gori); see
also United States v. Chapman, 593 F.3d 365, 368 (4th Cir. 2010) ("The Supreme Court has
never suggested that decisions about mistrials are 'of such a moment' that they can be made only
by the defendant himself, and every circuit to consider the question has concluded that decisions
regarding mistrials belong to the attorney, not the client. ... We likewise conclude that decisions
regarding a mistrial are tactical decisions entrusted to the sound judgment of counsel, not the
client."); People v. Hambrick, 96 A.D.3d 972, 973 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012) ("the defendant's
personal consent to a mistrial was not necessary, and his counsel's decision to move for a
mistrial was binding on the defendant"); People v. Hoffman, 265 N.W.2d 94, 98-99 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1978) (footnotes omitted) ("Although we, of course, encourage trial courts to elicit a
defendant's express consent to a mistrial, we do not believe that the absence of defendant's
personal consent necessarily bespeaks the absence of his primary control over the proceedings.").
6
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Mr. Bowman asserts that his case should be the exception to the rule. That is because this case
does not involve a typical mistrial situation wherein defense counsel makes a strategic or tactical
decision to move for a mistrial based on an evidentiary or legal error. In those situations, the
appellate courts have recognized the decision belongs to trial counsel without requiring the
defendant's personal consent. See Chapman, 593 F.3d at 368 ("Given the many issues that must
be identified, evaluated, and weighed when determining whether to seek or accept a mistrial, we
think it clear that the decision is a tactical one to be made by counsel, not the client."); see also

People v. Pagan, 248 A.D.2d 325, 326 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999) ("Defendant had no fundamental
right to be present during the proceedings at issue since the questioning of the eyewitness was
solely for the purpose of determining defense counsel's motion for a mistrial, a legal, not an
evidentiary, matter, as to which defendant's presence could not have afforded him any
meaningful opportunity to affect the outcome."). But, here, the mistrial did not implicate a
question of law or strategy reserved for trial counsel. It implicated a fundamental decision that
must be personally decided by Mr. Bowman-his right to proceed prose-because his counsel's
unavailability was the sole basis for the mistrial. Due to the constitutional right implicated by the
mistrial, Mr. Bowman should have been present to exercise his right to self-representation.
Two jurisdictions have identified this distinction between a strategic or tactical mistrial
and a mistrial that implicates another fundamental right belonging to the defendant. To start, the
U.S. Supreme Court has stated "the accused has the ultimate authority to make certain
fundamental decisions regarding the case, as to whether to plead guilty, waive a jury, testify in
his or her own behalf, or take an appeal." Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983). In addition,

See also People v. Mata, 302 P.3d 1039, 1043 (Cal. 2013) ("counsel here could assent in the trial
court's proposed remedy and thereby waive defendant's right to a mistrial").

18

"[t]he United States Constitution and the Idaho Constitution each guarantee the right to selfrepresentation." State v. Hawkins, 159 Idaho 507, 516 (2015) (citing Faretta v. California, 422
U.S. 806,819 (1975); State v. Folk, 151 Idaho 327,339 (2011)). In light of these fundamental
rights, in State v. Hart, 144 A.3d 609 (Md. 2016), the Court of Appeals of Maryland held the
trial judge erred by declaring a mistrial in the defendant's involuntary absence. There, the
defendant was absent for a medical emergency when the jury notified the district court that it was
deadlocked. Id. at 614. The district court inquired with the jury without the defendant present and
declared a mistrial (over defense counsel's objection). Id. at 615-16. The Maryland appellate
court held this was error because, in the "unique facts and circumstances of this case," the
defendant had the right to be present when the jury was called into the courtroom to inquire on
the deadlock. Id. at 626-30. The court concluded:
This is a unique case involving the interrelationship of the right to be present and
manifest necessity. Manifest necessity did not exist on the basis of the record
before us, because [the defendant] was involuntarily absent, and the court failed to
grant a continuance to determine the expected length of [the defendant's] absence
prior to its decision to proceed in absentia. We hold that the trial court erred in
declaring a mistrial sua sponte, because of the court's failure to conduct critical
inquiries . . . prior to exercising its discretion to proceed in absentia. Because the
declaration of a mistrial occurred in the absence of manifest necessity, a retrial is
prohibited on the grounds of double jeopardy.
Id. at 630. Similarly, in Bishop v. State, the Court of Appeals of Georgia made a distinction a

purely legal determination for a mistrial and a deadlocked jury mistrial. 335 S.E.2d 742, 745 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1985). The appellate court noted the defendant had a right to be present in the latter
because it implicated a fundamental right. Id. The court explained:
Appellant cites Bagwell v. State, 58 S.E. 650 (Ga. 1907), as establishing a right to
be present when a mistrial is ordered. However, in that case the court, without the
consent and in the absence of defendant, he being at the time confined in jail and
his counsel being absent, discharged the jury without a verdict when the jury
informed the court during its deliberations that it was unable to agree on a verdict.
The court held: "the court cannot legally order a mistrial in a case of this
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character, in the enforced absence of the accused and without his consent, because
of the inability of the jury to agree on a verdict, and that where a mistrial is so
ordered, the accused, on a subsequent trial, may plead former jeopardy." Id. at
652. There, the defendant was entitled to be present because events were
transpiring which he was entitled to observe and participate in so that he could
concur in the manner the proceedings were conducted or object to what was
being done or by his suggestion, effect the manner in which the proceedings were
conducted. But in the instant case, everything that was going to happen had
happened. The events upon which the court would rule were fixed. All that was
left to be done was a ferreting out of the relevant law and an application of it to
the situation which had developed. Legal consideration, not further proceedings,
was called for. And the court gave ample opportunity for "research." Apparently
defendant submitted none; he does not now complain that the court refused to
consider any authority he may have had in support of his position. The court
clearly took under advisement the matter of the legal effect of what had
transpired, and ruled a few days later on it. Failing to call parties, counsel, and
jurors back when the court issued its order does not commend itself as a
deprivation of defendant's right to be present at all stages of his trial.
Id. at 744--45 (emphasis added). In line with the legal principles in these cases, Mr. Bowman had

the right to be present at the declaration of the mistrial because it implicated his fundamental
decision to represent himself His presence was "critical" to the outcome because "his presence
would contribute to the fairness of the procedure." Dunlap, 155 Idaho at 368. Unlike a legal
question or a matter of strategy, Mr. Bowman's presence was necessary for him to exercise his
right to proceed pro se in light of his counsel's unavailability. In declaring the mistrial,
Mr. Bowman was "entitled to observe and participate" in the event "so that he could concur in
the manner the proceedings were conducted or object to what was being done or by his
suggestion." Bishop, 335 S.E.2d at 745.
In this situation, the district court should have given Mr. Bowman, personally, the
opportunity to be heard. "In making the manifest necessity determination, a district court ought
to obtain sufficient information to enable it to consider alternatives to a mistrial and give counsel
a timely and meaningful opportunity to be heard on the subject." Manley, 142 Idaho at 345
(emphasis added). The defendant has a "significant interest in the decision whether or not to take
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the case from the jury when circumstances occur which might be thought to warrant a
declaration of a mistrial." Stevens, 126 Idaho at 827. Here, Mr. Bowman asserted he would have
proceeded pro se, but the district court found his claim was not in good faith. (See Tr. Vol. III,
p.22, Ls.19-21, p.23, L.21-p.24, L.1, p.24, Ls.19-21.) Mr. Bowman submits the district court's
findings were not based on substantial and competent evidence because the district court made a
post-hoc inquiry after the mistrial. The proper procedure was for the district court to inquire,
personally, with Mr. Bowman at the time of the potential mistrial and determine, at that time,
whether Mr. Bowman genuinely desired to proceed pro se. Mr. Bowman submits the district
court's finding after the fact does not cure the mistrial error.
Indeed, a defendant "may not consent to a mistrial for many reasons"-"an accused may
have valid personal reasons for preferring to go ahead with the trial rather than starting all over
again, such as a desire to minimize the attendant embarrassment, expense and anxiety." Stevens,
126 Idaho at 827 (quoting Curry v. Superior Court of S.F., 470 P.2d 345, 367 (Cal. 1970) (en
bane)). "These considerations ... are peculiarly within the knowledge of the accused, not the
judge, and the latter must avoid depriving the accused of his constitutionally protected freedom
of choice in the name of a paternalistic concern for his welfare." Id. These "valid personal
reasons" are present here where Mr. Bowman intended to represent himself in order to continue
with the trial. This right to self-representation exists even if the jury will almost certainly find the
defendant guilty if he represents himself:
A defendant need not have a valid reason for seeking to act as his own attorney
any more than he or she needs a valid reason to exercise any other constitutional
right. "It is also well settled that the defendant has the right to reject court
appointed counsel and conduct his own defense."
State v. Hoppe, 139 Idaho 871, 875 (2003) (quoting State v. Clayton, 100 Idaho 896, 897

(1980)). Thus, the district court's failure to give Mr. Bowman an opportunity to be present and
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exercise his right to proceed pro se before declaring a mistrial was not consistent with the legal
standards and an abuse of discretion.
Because the district court abused its discretion in declaring a mistrial, there was no
manifest necessity to allow the retrial of Mr. Bowman. The "doctrine of manifest necessity
stands as a command to trial judges not to foreclose the defendant's option ['to go to a particular
tribunal'] until a scrupulous exercise of judicial discretion leads to the conclusion that the ends of
public justice would not be served by a continuation of the proceedings." United States v. Jorn,
400 U.S. 470, 485 (1971) (plurality opinion). The "power" to declare a mistrial must "be used
with the greatest caution, under urgent circumstances, and for very plain and obvious causes."
Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 580. Thus, if the trial court fails to "exercise a sound discretion" in

declaring the mistrial, the trial court has acted "irrationally" or "irresponsibly" and thus the
manifest necessity standard cannot be satisfied. Manley, 142 Idaho at 344--45 (no manifest
necessary for district court's sua sponte declaration of mistrial because the court did not
"adequately consider[ ] and then reject[ ] alternatives" or give the defendant "a chance to be
heard"); Stevens, 126 Idaho at 827-30 (no manifest necessity for trial judge's sua sponte
declaration of mistrial because judge made "no inquiry into all pertinent circumstances," did not
consider "all available options," or allow counsel "meaningful opportunity to be heard"); see
also Jorn, 400 U.S. at 487 (plurality opinion) (no manifest necessity for trial judge's sua sponte

declaration of mistrial because judge gave "no consideration" on the record to possibility of trial
continuance and gave prosecutor and defense no opportunity to respond). Absent manifest
necessity for the mistrial, the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibited retrial
of the charges against Mr. Bowman. See Manley, 142 Idaho at 344, 346; Stevens, 126 Idaho at
830; see also Washington, 434 U.S. at 505; Jorn, 400 U.S. at 487. Therefore, the district court
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erred by denying Mr. Bowman's motion to dismiss. His motion "should have been granted"
because "further prosecution" of the crimes "is barred by the constitutional prohibition against
double jeopardy." Manley, 142 Idaho at 346.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Bowman respectfully requests this Court reverse or vacate the district court's orders
denying his motions to dismiss and remand this case for further proceedings, including
dismissal of the charges.
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